W hat are the sources of aggregate fluctuations? To answer this question, macroeconomists often rely on aggregate data and the representative agent framework, thereby abstracting from underlying heterogeneity in the economy. One common approach is to use aggregate productivity shocks, preference shocks, or more generally wedges on the optimality conditions of the representative agent to account for aggregate fluctuations. An obvious advantage of this approach is its simplicity, and it has, for example, been used to infer the relative importance of financial frictions as a driver of business cycles.
We obtain two main results. First, in all three model variants a credit crunch shows up as a different wedge. A credit crunch shows up as an efficiency wedge if there is heterogeneity in the productivity of final goods producers. In contrast, it shows up as an investment wedge if we replace heterogeneity in the productivity of final goods producers with heterogeneous investment costs. Finally, a credit crunch shows up as a labor wedge in an economy with heterogeneous recruitment costs. Second, and more importantly, all three model variants have an undistorted Euler equation for the aggregate of firm owners, in contrast to the intuition that collateral constraints show up as investment wedges by distorting aggregate investment. 2 We show that this is due to a general equilibrium effect and argue that investment wedges from shocks to collateral constraints are largely an artifact of partial equilibrium reasoning, or auxiliary assumptions, e.g., heterogeneous discount rates. Taken together, our two results imply that identifying a credit crunch from standard aggregate data, like output, labor, and investment, is problematic (if not impossible). 3 Having analyzed the implications of a credit crunch for aggregate wedges, we then take a somewhat broader perspective and study its implications for other macroeconomic aggregates and also those at the micro level. In all three model variants, a credit crunch leads to a decline in consumption, investment, the interest rate, and the ratio of gross credit to the capital stock, and an increase in the return premium measured as the difference between the aggregate marginal product of capital and the interest rate. The aggregate marginal product of capital declines in the model with heterogeneous final goods producers, but it increases in the model with heterogeneous investment costs. Finally, we argue that the aggregate evidence from the Great Recession suggests that the model variants with heterogeneous final goods producers and recruitment costs hold the most promise as positive theories of the business cycle and deserve being explored in greater detail.
Our model features entrepreneurs that have access to three constant returns to scale technologies: a technology to produce final goods, another technology to transform final goods into capital, and a third technology for transforming recruitment effort today into workers in the following period. The three model variants we study only differ in the technology in which entrepreneurs are heterogeneous. In all three model variants, entrepreneurs face collateral constraints that limit their ability to acquire capital or recruit workers. buera and moll: aggregate implications of a credit crunch In addition to entrepreneurs, the economy is populated by a continuum of homogeneous workers. We consider two alternative assumptions regarding workers' access to asset markets: the case of financial autarky and the case where they are allowed to save in a risk-free bond. The first assumption allows for a sharper theoretical characterization of the model's transition dynamics. We also consider an extension where workers face shocks to their efficiency units of labor.
We first study the model variant with heterogeneous final goods productivity, and no heterogeneity in investment and recruitment costs. Aggregate TFP evolves endogenously as a function of the collateral constraint and the distribution of entrepreneurial wealth. Under the assumption of logarithmic preferences, a credit crunch is exactly isomorphic to a TFP shock. In addition, while individual investment decisions are distorted, aggregate investment can be characterized in terms of the Euler equation of a representative entrepreneur that is undistorted. This result is due to a general equilibrium effect: in response to a credit crunch, the interest rate adjusts in such a way that bonds remain in zero net supply; this implies that the aggregate return to wealth equals the aggregate return to capital, and the credit crunch is entirely absorbed by a decrease in TFP. While these results are exact only for the case of logarithmic utility, we show by means of numerical simulations that they hold approximately for the case of general Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) preferences under standard parameter values.
Once we aggregate entrepreneurs, the economy consists of two types of agents, a representative entrepreneur and a representative worker. If workers are in financial autarky, an investment wedge is needed to characterize aggregate data in terms of a representative agent. However, we show that this investment wedge is negative: a credit crunch looks like an episode in which investment is subsidized, not taxed. 5 Furthermore, we show by means of simulations that the investment wedge is negligible under the alternative assumption that workers face idiosyncratic labor income risk and save in a risk-free bond.
Having studied our first model variant with heterogeneous final goods productivity, we consider two variants with heterogeneity along two other dimensions. In the second model variant entrepreneurs face heterogeneous investment costs-meaning they differ in their technologies to transform final goods into investment goodsbut are homogeneous in their final goods production and recruitment technologies. In the third model economy entrepreneurs face heterogeneous recruitment costsmeaning they differ in their technologies to transform recruitment effort today into workers in the following period.
In these model variants, a credit crunch shows up as an investment wedge and a labor wedge, respectively. While a credit crunch maps into different wedges in all three model variants, the logic is always the same: a credit crunch worsens the allocation of resources across heterogeneous entrepreneurs and this misallocation but are not subject to financial (or other) frictions, this heterogeneity does not matter in the sense that the sector can be represented by means of an aggregate production function. This argument highlights the fact that it is really the interaction between financial frictions and heterogeneity-rather than either financial frictions or heterogeneity by themselves-that is crucial for our results.
5 This is because workers are borrowed constrained and, therefore, the growth rate of their consumption is bound to be larger than that of entrepreneurs.
Our paper instead evaluates the usefulness of wedges on a more basic level. Wedges have been used for at least two purposes. First, they have been used as a "diagnostic" for identifying the primitive shocks driving business cycles (Cole and Ohanian 2002; Ohanian 2010) . 8 This approach is invalidated by our finding that the same shock-a credit crunch-shows up as a different wedge depending on the form of underlying heterogeneity.
9 Second, wedges have been used as a "guide" to build better models: given knowledge of a specific primitive shock, say a credit crunch, the observed wedges are used to narrow down the class of mechanisms through which this shock leads to economic fluctuations. This more nuanced approach is for example advocated by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) , at least in most parts of their paper. 10 In this interpretation a wedge is "just another moment" that a model can be calibrated to. We agree with this characterization. While wedges cannot be used to 6 The idea of using such wedges to draw inferences about the sources of aggregate fluctuations goes back at least to Parkin (1988) who studies the labor wedge.
7 Christiano and Davis (2006) show that this result is, for example, not robust to the introduction of investment adjustment costs or to an alternative formulation of the investment wedge in terms of a tax on the gross return on capital rather than a tax on the price of investment goods. Tambalotti (2010, 2011) view the data through the lens of a "New Keynesian" model instead of an RBC model, and argue that most business cycle fluctuations are driven by shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment, the equivalent of an investment wedge. They then point out that these investment shocks might proxy for financial frictions.
8 For example, Ohanian (2010, 56) states: "The capital deviation is equivalent to capital market imperfections […] . The diagnostic findings presented above, however, show that these capital deviations were small in the 2007-2009 recession." 9 Or, again more precisely, depending on the interaction of financial frictions with different forms of heterogeneity. See the discussion in footnote 4. 10 In contrast, other parts of their paper can be read as advocating the use of wedges as a "diagnostic" for identifying specific shocks. For example, in their figure 1, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan show that their measured investment wedge is smaller between 1932 and 1939 than it is in 1929, looking as if investment decisions are less distorted. They then note that "this investment wedge pattern does not square with models of business cycles in which financial frictions increase in downturns and decrease in recoveries." identify the primitive shocks driving business cycles, they may be useful moments for discriminating among alternative models by comparing their responses to a particular shock. When pursuing the second route for the case of a financial shock, a representative agent model should not be the last step. Instead, we argue that it is key to explicitly model the heterogeneity giving rise to financial transactions because heterogeneity may interact with the financial shock in unexpected ways.
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We are by no means the first to point out that financial frictions can manifest themselves as efficiency or labor wedges rather than investment wedges. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) themselves present two example economies with financial frictions and study how these map into aggregate wedges. In the first example, they show that what they call "input-financing frictions" show up as an investment wedge and an efficiency wedge (see their proposition 1), and in a knife-edge case, only as an efficiency wedge. In the second example, they show that what they call " investment-financing frictions," and which resemble those in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) , map into investment wedges only. Their results differ from ours in two respects. First, we argue that completely standard collateral constraints that limit the amount of debt entrepreneurs can issue before investing (and are therefore a form of "investment-financing friction") can manifest themselves as efficiency wedges only; and that whether this happens or not depends on the form of underlying heterogeneity. Second, we show that, within our framework with collateral constraints, the absence of an investment wedge relies on the economy being in general equilibrium but is otherwise very general, rather than being a knife-edge case as in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan's first example.
Similarly, a growing, more recent literature argues that financial frictions can cause aggregate productivity losses (Khan and Thomas 2013; Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek 2014) or manifest themselves in a labor wedge (Jermann and Quadrini 2012; Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe 2012) . 12 We view our paper as complementary to these, but novel along two dimensions. First, we stress that one main reason why financial frictions may show up in different aggregates is their interaction with different forms of underlying heterogeneity. Because some form of heterogeneity is essential for financial frictions to "have bite," this should be considered a generic feature of many models with financial frictions, a point we emphasize by working with a relatively standard and off-the-shelf model in which we have mainly enriched the underlying heterogeneity. Second, we argue that the intuition that collateral constraints should show up as investment wedges by distorting aggregate investment is an artifact of partial equilibrium reasoning or auxiliary assumptions, 11 Further, micro rather than aggregate data may be better suited to narrow down the mechanisms through which a given shock operates. In our framework, for instance, observed wedges in combination with knowledge of a credit crunch could, in principle, be used to assess the relative importance of our three forms of underlying heterogeneity. However, the statement "if only there were a credit crunch so that we could find out where the heterogeneity is" seems backwards at best. Examining micro data is the much more obvious strategy for identifying sources of heterogeneity.
12 That financial frictions cause aggregate productivity losses is a popular theme in the growth and development literature. Among others, see Banerjee and Duflo (2005) ; Jeong and Townsend (2007) ; Buera and Shin (2013) ; Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011); and Moll (2014) . Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) and Moll (2014) also argue that aggregate capital accumulation-as measured by the steady state capital-to-output ratio-is unaffected in their models with heterogeneous final goods producers. e.g., heterogeneous discount rates. This follows from our result that our three model variants have an undistorted Euler equation for the aggregate of firm owners.
None of our criticisms are special to wedges. They apply one-for-one to other papers that try to learn about the sources of business cycle fluctuations using a representative agent framework and aggregate data alone, for example most of the "New Keynesian" literature as exemplified by Smets and Wouters (2007) and Galí, Smets, and Wouters (2012) . 13 In raising these concerns, our paper has much in common with the work by Chang and Kim (2007) and Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2010) , who examine heterogeneous-agent economies with incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor. They show that a macroeconomist examining aggregate time-series generated by their model with neither distortions nor labor-supply shocks would conclude that their economy features a time-varying labor wedge or preference shock, and that therefore abstracting from cross-sectional heterogeneity can potentially mislead policy predictions. See Geweke (1985) and Blinder (1987) for earlier critiques of representative agent models when heterogeneity is important.
Following Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , a large theoretical literature studies the role of credit market imperfections in business cycle fluctuations. Most papers are similar to ours in that they study heterogeneous entrepreneurs subject to borrowing constraints. In light of our finding that the exact form of heterogeneity matters, we note that most of them assume that entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their investment technologies (Carlstrom and Fuerst 1997; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore 1997 , 2005 Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno 2010; Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010; Kurlat 2013; Wang and Wen 2012) .
14 Models with entrepreneurs that are heterogeneous in their final goods productivity are rarer. Exceptions are the papers by Kiyotaki (1998) ; Kocherlakota (2009) ; Bassetto, Cagetti, and De Nardi (2013) ; Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) ; Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2014) ; and Khan and Thomas (2013) .
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An important distinctive feature of our model is an undistorted Euler equation for the aggregate of firm owners. In most of the literature, this result does not hold because it is assumed that borrowers and lenders differ in their rates of time preference so as to guarantee that entrepreneurs are constrained in equilibrium. Instead, we explicitly model the stochastic evolution of the productivity of entrepreneurs, and their decision to be either active and demand capital, or inactive and supply their 13 Smets and Wouters (2007) use aggregate time series and a representative agent model with various structural shocks, including a risk premium shock and an investment-specific technology shock, to understand the sources of business cycle fluctuations. Similarly, Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) argue that a "financial friction wedge" is the key to understanding the recession of 2007 to 2009. 14 Kiyotaki and Moore (1997 , 2005 and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) make the assumption that each period "investment opportunities" arrive randomly to some exogenous fraction of entrepreneurs. Only entrepreneurs with an "investment opportunity" can acquire new investment goods; others cannot. In our framework, this corresponds to an extreme, binary, form of heterogeneous investment costs: either investment costs are zero, corresponding to the arrival of an investment opportunity, or infinite.
15 Our paper and the majority of the literature focus on credit constraints on the production side of the economy, more precisely those faced by entrepreneurs. In contrast, Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) and Philippon and Midrigan (2011) focus on borrowing constraints at the household level, and Gertler and Karadi (2011) One of the main contributions of this paper is to derive analytic expressions for the various wedges despite the rich underlying heterogeneity. To deliver such tractability, we build on work by Angeletos (2007) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) . Their insight is that heterogeneous agent economies remain tractable if individual production functions feature constant returns to scale because then individual policy rules are linear in individual wealth.
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Our paper is organized according to the different dimensions of heterogeneity we consider: heterogeneous productivity (Section I), heterogeneous investment costs (Section II), and heterogeneous recruitment costs (Section III). In Section IV, we discuss the aggregate implications beyond wedges, as well as the micro-implications of different model variants, and briefly discuss promising directions for future research. Section V is a conclusion.
I. Benchmark Model: Heterogeneous Productivity

A. Preferences and Technology
Time is discrete. There is a continuum of entrepreneurs that are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] . Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their productivity, z it , their capital holdings, k it , and their debt, d it . Each period, entrepreneurs draw a new productivity from a distribution ψ(z) . Importantly, this productivity shock is not only independent and identically distributed across entrepreneurs but also independent and identically distributed over time.
18 These assumptions imply a law of large numbers so the share of entrepreneurs experiencing any particular sequence of shocks is deterministic. Entrepreneurs have preferences
Each entrepreneur owns a private firm which uses k it units of capital and ℓ it units of labor to produce
In addition to assuming that individuals differ in their discount factors, some of the papers in the literature (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler 1989; Carlstrom and Fuerst 1997; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999) assume that entrepreneurs are identical ex ante and only heterogeneous ex post and that there is a real cost of default. This assumption implies that entrepreneurs face a wedge between their ex ante cost of funds and the risk-free rate. 17 In contrast to the present paper, Angeletos focuses on the role of "uninsured idiosyncratic investment risk" and does not feature collateral constraints (except for the so-called "natural" borrowing constraint). Kiyotaki and Moore analyze a similar setup with borrowing constraints but their focus is on understanding the implications of monetary factors for aggregate fluctuations. 18 In the online Appendix we analyze the case where productivity is persistent. The conclusions for the case of logarithmic utility function are unaffected by relaxing the assumption that shocks are independent and identically distributed over time.
units of output, where α ∈ (0, 1) . Entrepreneurs also have access to the following linear technology to transform final goods into investment goods
where x it is investment and δ is the depreciation rate.
There is a unit mass of workers. Workers have preferences over consumption and hours worked
where u is as in (1) and v is increasing and convex. For most of our results, we restrict the analysis to the case where workers do not have access to assets, and therefore, are hand-to-mouth consumers. We later present numerical results for the case where workers have the same preferences as (4), can accumulate risk-free bonds, and face idiosyncratic labor endowment shocks.
B. Budgets
Entrepreneurs hire workers in a competitive labor market at a wage w t . They also trade in risk-free bonds. Denote by d it the stock of bonds issued by an entrepreneur; that is his debt. When d it < 0 the entrepreneur is a net lender. The budget constraint is
Entrepreneurs face borrowing constraints
This formulation of capital market imperfections is analytically convenient. It says that at most a fraction θ t of next period's capital stock can be externally financed. Or alternatively, the down payment on debt used to finance capital has to be at least a fraction 1 − θ t of the capital stock. Different underlying frictions can give rise to such borrowing constraints, for example limited commitment. Finally, note that by varying θ t , we can trace out all degrees of efficiency of capital markets; θ t = 1 corresponds to a perfect capital market, and θ t = 0 to the case where it is completely shut down. The implications of variations in θ t over the business cycle for aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) and capital are the main theme of this paper. For simplicity, we focus on the case where the θ t fluctuates deterministically and households have perfect foresight about the entire sequence of future θ t s. Because there are no other aggregate shocks, all aggregate variables and in particular the wage and the interest rate are deterministic as well. The case in which fluctuations in θ t are stochastic, or in which there are other aggregate shocks (say, to aggregate total factor productivity), can be worked out at the expense of some extra notation; but all our results go through and no additional insights are gained.
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Timing.-In order for there to be an interesting role for credit markets, an entrepreneur's productivity next period, z t+1 , is revealed at the end of period t , before the entrepreneur issues his debt d t+1 . That is, entrepreneurs can borrow to finance investment corresponding to their new productivity. Besides introducing a more interesting role for credit markets, a second purpose of this assumption is to eliminate "uninsured idiosyncratic investment risk." This is the focus of Angeletos (2007) and is well understood.
The budget constraint of entrepreneurs can be simplified slightly. The capital income of an entrepreneur is
Maximizing out over labor, we obtain the following simple and linear expression for profits:
This implies that the budget constraint of an entrepreneur reduces to
C. Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is defined in the usual way. That is, an equilibrium are sequences of prices { r t , w t } t=0 ∞ , and corresponding quantities such that entrepreneurs maximize (1) subject to (6) and (9), taking as given { r t , w t } t=0 ∞ , and markets clear at all points in time: 20 In the case of logarithmic utility, σ = 1 , all our expressions remain exactly unchanged. This is because-as we show in Section IE-with log utility and individual constant returns to scale, entrepreneurs do not engage in precautionary savings so that additional aggregate uncertainty does not alter their savings behavior. Derivations for the case with aggregate uncertainty are available upon request.
Summing up entrepreneurs' and workers' budget constraints and using these market clearing conditions, we also obtain the aggregate resource constraints of the economy which we find useful to state here:
Here, K t , y t , and X t are the aggregate capital stock, output, and investment. c t is aggregate consumption which is the sum of total consumption by entrepreneurs, c t E , and workers, c t W .
D. Aggregate Wedges
The goal of this paper is to study the mapping from a credit crunch to aggregate variables. A popular summary of the behavior of aggregate variables is to consider the wedges that are needed for the aggregate variables to be the optimal decisions of a representative agent. To study this representation we follow the literature, in particular Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) , and define these wedges as follows.
∞ generated by our model economy. The efficiency wedge is defined as
Finally, the investment wedge, τ Xt , is defined by
, all t .
These wedges have the natural interpretation of productivity, and labor and investment taxes in a representative agent economy with resource constraint (12), Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function y t = A t K t α L t 1−α and preferences of the representative consumer given by ∑ t=0
. Equation (14) has the interpretation of the labor supply and labor demand conditions with the labor wedge corresponding to a labor income tax. Equation (15) has the interpretation of the Euler equation of the representative consumer and the investment wedge, τ Xt , then resembles a tax rate on investment.
21 21 More precisely, consider the following competitive equilibrium in this economy. The representative consumer maximizes his utility function subject to the budget constraint
and the capital accumulation law K t+1 = X t + (1 − δ) K t , where r t is the rental rate and T t are lump-sum transfers. Equation (15) is the corresponding Euler equation. Further, a representative firm maximizes profits given by In our economy, by assumption only entrepreneurs invest; workers only supply labor. In answering the question whether aggregate investment is distorted, it will therefore sometimes be useful to examine what we term the entrepreneurial investment wedge. This object is analogous to the investment wedge just defined, but uses only aggregate data on quantities pertaining to entrepreneurs. The definition of a worker labor wedge will be similarly useful below.
∞ generated by the model economy. The entrepreneurial investment wedge, τ Xt E , is defined by the equation
The worker labor wedge,
As we will show below, it turns out that the investment wedge, τ Xt , and labor wedge, τ L t , do not necessarily equal the entrepreneurial investment wedge, τ Xt E , and worker labor wedge, τ L t W .
E. Log utility
We find it instructive to first present our model and main result for the special case of log utility, σ = 1 .
individual Behavior.-The problem of an entrepreneur can be written recursively as:
Here we denote by z −1 the productivity of an entrepreneur in the current period, by z his productivity in the next period, and by z′ his productivity two periods ahead. The Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) term this the "benchmark prototype economy."
22 It is easy to see that τ Xt ≠ τ Xt E if the marginal rate of substitution of the "representative worker,"
. This is what will be shown in Proposition 1.
expectation is taken over z′ only, because-as we previously discussed-we assume that an entrepreneur knows z at the time he chooses capital and debt holdings. The value function is time-varying reflecting the fact that the collateral constraint parameter θ t and prices, r t and w t , vary along the transition. This problem can be simplified. To this end define an entrepreneur's "cash-on-hand," m it , and "net worth," a it , as
LEMMA 1: using the definitions in (18), the following dynamic program is equivalent to (17):
The interpretation of this result is that the problem of an entrepreneur can be solved as a two-stage budgeting problem. In the first stage, the entrepreneur chooses how much net worth, a′ , to carry over to the next period. In the second stage, conditional on a′ , he then solves an optimal portfolio allocation problem where he decides how to split his net worth between capital, k′ and bonds, −d′ . The borrowing constraint (6) immediately implies that the amount of capital he holds can be at most a multiple λ t ≡ (1 − θ t ) −1 of this net worth. λ t is therefore the maximum attainable leverage. From now on, a credit crunch will interchangeably mean a drop in θ t or λ t .
LEMMA 2: capital and debt holdings are linear in net worth, and there is a productivity cutoff for being active z _ t+1 .
The productivity cutoff is defined by z _ t+1 π t+1 = r t+1 + δ .
Both the linearity and cutoff properties follow directly from the fact that individual technologies (2) display constant returns to scale in capital and labor. We have already shown that maximizing out over labor in (7), profits are linear in capital, (8). It follows that the optimal capital choice is at a corner: it is zero for entrepreneurs with low productivity, and the maximal amount allowed by the collateral constraints, λ t a′ , for those with high productivity. The productivity of the marginal entrepreneur is z _ t+1 . For him, the return on one unit of capital z π t+1 equals the user cost of capital, r t+1 + δ . The linearity of capital and debt delivers much of the tractability of our model.
LEMMA 3: Entrepreneurs save a constant fraction of cash-on-hand:
or using the definitions of cash-on-hand and net worth in (18)
Aggregation.-Aggregating (21) over all entrepreneurs, we obtain our first main result:
PROPOSITION 1: Aggregate quantities satisfy
where
is measured TFP. The cutoff is defined by
and satisfies an Euler equation for the "representative entrepreneur":
Aggregate consumption of workers is given by c t
A credit crunch.-In this section, we conduct the following thought experiment: consider an economy that is in steady state at time, t = 0 , with a given degree of financial friction, λ 0 (equivalently, θ 0 = 1 − 1/ λ 0 ). At time t = 1 , there is a credit crunch: λ t falls and then recovers over time according to (27) λ t+1 = (1 − ρ) λ 0 + ρ λ t , ρ ∈ (0, 1) until it reaches the precrunch level of λ 0 . 
(iv) results in a worker labor wedge τ L t W = 0 , and a labor wedge given by
A credit crunch distorts the investment decisions of individual entrepreneurs. One may have expected that therefore also the investment decision of a "representative entrepreneur" is distorted. Part (ii) of the proposition states that this is not the case: a credit crunch lowers aggregate investment only to the extent that it lowers TFP and therefore the aggregate marginal product of capital; the wedge in the Euler equation of a representative entrepreneur is identically zero. This result is not straightforward. Much of the next subsection-which also covers the more general case of CRRA utility-will be concerned with discussing the intuition behind it. Part (iii) of the proposition states that while aggregate investment is not distorted, there is nevertheless a nonzero investment wedge as in Definition 1. This is because, while the Euler equation of the "representative entrepreneur" is not distorted, the "representative worker" is borrowing constrained and has consumption c t W = (1 − α) y t . Aggregate consumption is the sum of the consumption of workers and entrepreneurs. The aggregate investment wedge is found by matching up two equations: the growth rate of aggregate consumption and the equation defining the aggregate investment (15). It can easily be seen that a nonzero investment wedge is needed to match up these two equations. Its size depends on relative consumption growth of entrepreneurs and workers. We will argue momentarily that this investment wedge is actually "upside down," in the sense of looking like a subsidy to investment as opposed to a tax. Furthermore, this investment wedge is really an artifact of one of the modeling assumptions we make to obtain closed forms, namely that workers cannot save. We show that under the alternative assumption that workers can save in a riskless asset and face idiosyncratic labor income risk, the investment wedge becomes negligible. Finally, part (iv) shows that there is also a labor wedge. This is the case even though workers are on their labor supply curve (the worker labor wedge is zero), and-as was the case for the investment wedge-results from our assumption that entrepreneurs and workers are two distinct classes of agents. 23 Since the two are isomorphic, we choose the initial drop in λ t so as to cause a 10 percent decline in productivity. Figure 2 shows the effect of a credit crunch on aggregate TFP (panel A), the entrepreneurial investment wedge and the investment wedge (panel B), and the labor wedge (panel C). Panel A simply restates the productivity drop from Figure 1 . Panel B shows the entrepreneurial investment wedge, τ Xt E , which is zero throughout the transition as discussed in the Proposition. Panel B also shows the investment wedge, τ Xt . It is positive at first, and negative throughout most of the transition; in steady state, it is zero because consumption growth for both 23 We use the following parametrization of the model: β = 0.95 , δ = 0.06 , α = 0.33 , λ 0 = 3 , and assume that the distribution of productivity of entrepreneurs is uniform, z ∈ [0, 1] . (28)). Importantly, and contrary to what the reader may have expected, the investment wedge is negative, meaning it looks like a subsidy. Finally, panel C shows the labor wedge defined in (14), which also looks like a subsidy. 24 That both the investment and the labor wedge do not equal zero is mainly due to our modeling assumptions, an issue we discuss now.
In order to obtain closed-form solutions, we have separated individuals into "entrepreneurs" and "workers" and have assumed that the latter cannot save. Since workers are by assumption not "on their Euler equation," it is this assumption that delivers a zero entrepreneurial investment wedge, but a nonzero investment wedge. The left panel of Figure 3 presents the investment wedge under two alternative assumptions on the savings behavior of workers: they save in a risk-free bond; and they save in a risk-free bond and additionally face some labor income risk as in Aiyagari (1994) . In both cases we assume that they need to hold nonnegative wealth, i.e., they cannot borrow. Details are in Appendix C. When workers save in a risk-free bond but face no labor income risk (dash-dotted line), the investment wedge is negative throughout the entire transition. That the investment wedge is not zero comes from the fact that while workers can save, they are still borrowing constrained. This is because the interest rate in our economy is less than the rate of time preference and therefore, in the absence of risk, workers hold zero wealth in the initial steady state. A negative TFP shock triggered by a credit crunch decreases the wage and only worsens this borrowing constraint. This implies that their consumption growth rate is higher than that of entrepreneurs and hence from (28) that the investment wedge is negative. In contrast, with labor income risk (solid line), workers in the initial steady state hold positive wealth due to precautionary motifs. This means that only a small fraction of them end up borrowing constrained when their wage falls after a credit crunch. Most 24 In contrast, the worker labor wedge, which we choose not to display here, is identically zero throughout the transition. Figure 3 presents the labor wedge under two alternative assumptions on saving behavior. As discussed in Proposition 2, the labor wedge is a function of the consumption of entrepreneurs relative to that of workers. In the two extensions where workers accumulate assets, the difference in the growth rate of the consumption of workers and entrepreneurs is smaller, and therefore, the movements in the labor wedge is smoother.
F. General crrA utility and intuition for undistorted Aggregate Euler Equation
This section presents the case where individuals' preferences are given by the general CRRA utility function (1). It also presents an alternative and more intuitive derivation of the result in Proposition 2 that a credit crunch does not distort the Euler equation of a representative entrepreneur, τ Xt E = 0 . We show that the result follows from a general equilibrium effect that comes from bonds being in zero net supply. The analysis of the saving problem of individual entrepreneurs with CRRA utility is similar to the log case analyzed in the preceding section. 26 We therefore relegate the details to the online Appendix. 
is the return to wealth and
Ultimately, the labor wedge in our benchmark model stems from the fact that entrepreneurs do not supply labor. We conjecture that a relatively straightforward extension of our model where entrepreneurs supply labor will feature a negligible labor wedge. 26 For σ ≠ 1 , the saving policy function cannot be solved in closed form anymore. While the saving policy function can still be shown to be linear in cash-on-hand, the saving rate now depends on future productivity, z it+1 (which is known at time t ): a it+1 = s t+1 ( z it+1 ) a it . With log utility s t+1 ( z it+1 ) = β is constant because the income and substitution effects of a higher productivity draw exactly offset each other. 27 The Euler equation (29) is u′( c it ) = βE[u′( c it+1 ) r it+1 a ] . The return to wealth r it+1 a can be taken out of the expectation because of our assumption that next period's productivity z it+1 and therefore r it+1 a is known at the time a it+1 is chosen. Further, the second equality in (30) uses the complementary slackness condition ( r it+1
is the return to capital. Note that for credit constrained entrepreneurs, the return to capital is greater than the interest rate, r it+1 k > 1 + r t+1 . Therefore also their return to savings is higher than the interest rate, r it+1 a > 1 + r t+1 , which is to say that individual Euler equations are distorted. 28 In contrast, and as we have shown in Proposition 2, aggregate investment is undistorted under certain conditions. The goal of this section is to show how distorted individual Euler equations can be aggregated to obtain an undistorted aggregate Euler equation of the form (26). This alternative derivation of (26) has the advantage that directly working with individual Euler equations is more intuitive and also underlines that the logic behind our result is, in fact, quite general.
Euler Equation of representative Entrepreneur.-We aggregate (29) by taking a wealth weighted average to obtain:
It is useful to separately analyze the left-hand side and right-hand side of this equation. We denote these by
right-Hand side.-By manipulating the right-hand side, (34), we obtain the following Lemma.
LEMMA 4 (RHS):
A wealth weighted average of the return to wealth accumulation across entrepreneurs equals the aggregate marginal product of capital:
where the second equality uses that bonds are in zero net supply, (10). Using the definition of r it+1 k , (31), we get
Lemma 4 will be the main building block of the result that the Euler equation of a representative entrepreneur is not distorted (Proposition 3). The proof of the Lemma has two main steps: the first step is to show that the aggregate return to wealth equals the aggregate return to capital. Entrepreneurs can allocate their wealth between two assets, capital, and bonds. But in the aggregate, bonds are in zero net supply. Therefore the aggregate return to wealth must equal the aggregate return to capital. This result is remarkably general. It does not in any way depend on the form of utility or production functions. For example, the latter could display decreasing returns to scale. We spend some more time discussing this result in the next paragraph. The second step in the proof is to show that a capital weighted average of the returns to capital, (31), equals the aggregate marginal product of capital:
The assumption of Cobb-Douglas production functions is crucial for this step because it implies that the marginal product of capital is proportional to the average product. Given the Cobb-Douglas assumption, this second step is relatively mechanical and we will not discuss it further. The key to understanding Lemma 4 is a general equilibrium effect that comes from bonds being in zero net supply. To gain some intuition, consider an economy that starts in equilibrium with ( λ t , r t+1 ) = (λ, r) . At time t , a credit crunch hits and leverage decreases to λ * < λ . We index variables by (λ, r) and trace out the economy's response. We suppress time subscripts for notational simplicity. When r is fixed in partial equilibrium, an immediate effect of the credit crunch is that credit is restricted and hence aggregate capital demand drops below aggregate capital supply
Following similar steps as in Lemma 4, the wealth weighted average of individual returns to wealth can be shown to be
In partial equilibrium, a credit crunch causes the aggregate return to wealth to fall below the aggregate return to capital. This is because the credit crunch results in a positive share of the aggregate portfolio being allocated towards bonds, which earn a lower return than capital. The implication is that a credit crunch looks like the introduction of a tax on the returns to capital, with the second line of (36) corresponding to the pretax return and the first line to the after-tax return. Put another way: in partial equilibrium, the entrepreneurial investment wedge is positive. In general equilibrium, however, things look quite different. An immediate implication of (35) is that the interest rate must fall until bonds are in zero net supply, or equivalently K( λ * , r * ) = A . This immediately implies that
Bonds being in zero net supply means that the share of the aggregate portfolio invested in bonds equals zero as before the credit crunch. Therefore the aggregate return to wealth again equals the aggregate return to capital, and the effect of the credit crunch is entirely absorbed by a decrease in TFP. This general equilibrium effect obviously hinges on our economy being closed. In an open economy a credit crunch would lead to an increase in the entrepreneurial investment wedge. We find it worthwhile to note that the sign of the level of the investment wedge is generally ambiguous. In particular it will often be negative, meaning it looks like a subsidy to investment. 29, 30 Another crucial assumption is that the borrowing constraint takes the form (6). Consider instead a more general borrowing constraint k it+1 ≤ b it+1 ( a it+1 , z it+1 , r t+1 , w t+1 , …) . One can show that Lemma 4 holds if and only if the elasticity of the borrowing limit, b it+1 , with respect to wealth, a it+1 , is one. Apart from that, the borrowing constraint can be a general function of, say, individual productivities, prices, and so on.
Left-Hand side.-By manipulating the left-hand side (33), we obtain the following lemma. 29 In an open economy with log utility, and similar to (36), the Euler equation of a representative entrepreneur is
and therefore the entrepreneurial investment wedge as defined in (16) is negative whenever the economy's aggregate capital stock, K t+1 , is greater than its aggregate wealth A t+1 . Depending on the degree of heterogeneity, a negative investment wedge may, in fact, be the only possibility. To see this, consider the degenerate case with homogeneous entrepreneurs who all face the same collateral constraints K t+1 ≤ λ t A t+1 , λ t ≥ 1 . Since everyone is alike, the constraint can only bind if the economy as a whole is borrowing, K t+1 > A t+1 . The investment wedge must therefore be negative in this degenerate case. The intuition is straightforward: for a constrained entrepreneur, each dollar saved has an additional shadow value because it relaxes his borrowing constraint. 30 Another reason why the real interest might not adjust is because it is constrained by the lower bound on the nominal interest rate in a situation where the inflation rate is low. Buera and Nicolini (2014) , who study a monetary extension of our model, find that our results are mostly unchanged when the government follow an unresponsive monetary rule, as the equilibrium dynamics of inflation allows the real rate to adjust even though the nominal interest rate is contained by the zero lower bound. They also consider cases in which the government implements an inflation target, where this conjecture is partially verified.
LEMMA 5 (LHS):
and s t+1 (z) is the saving rate of type z .
For the special case of log utility, σ = 1 , all entrepreneurs save the same fraction of their cash-on-hand regardless of their type, s t (z) = β . Hence (37) specializes to
combining Left-Hand side and right-Hand side.-In the case of log utility, (38) and Lemma 4 together immediately imply the undistorted aggregate Euler equation in (26). 31 In the more general case of CRRA utility, we can still combine Lemmas 4 and 5 to obtain Proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 3: in our benchmark economy with general crrA utility, a credit crunch (i ) results in an entrepreneurial investment wedge, τ Xt
E defined by
where the initial (steady state) value is τ X0 E = (β/ _ s − 1)/(1 − β(1 − δ)) .
(ii ) results in an investment wedge, τ Xt , defined by
where the initial (steady state) investment wedge is τ X0 = τ X0 E .
Consistent with Proposition 2, the entrepreneurial investment wedge in (i) collapses to τ Xt E = 0 for the case of log utility σ = 1 . This is because in that case _ s t = β .
31 Similarly, the law of motion of the aggregate capital stock in the economy with CRRA utility is
For the special case σ = 1 , and hence s t (z) = β , we obtain (23).
For σ ≠ 1 , the entrepreneurial investment wedge can be either positive or negative. We illustrate this in Figure 4 which shows the effect of a credit crunch for three different values of the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ . A value of σ = 1 corresponds to log utility and therefore the transition dynamics for that case are identical to Figure 2 . The entrepreneurial investment wedge (panel B) is positive for the case where σ < 1 and negative for the case σ > 1 . This is intuitive: if entrepreneurs are relatively unwilling to substitute intertemporally ( σ is high), they overaccumulate assets. In aggregate data, this looks like a subsidy to savings. The wedges further depend on σ in a continuous fashion: for values of σ that are "close" to one such as the ones chosen in the figure, the wedges are "similar" to the log-case. Finally, the nonzero entrepreneurial investment wedge for the case σ ≠ 1 is best thought of as arising from individual marginal utilities not being equalized under incomplete markets, rather than from the presence of borrowing constraints. The parameter governing borrowing constraints, λ t , only enters the aggregate Euler equation (32) through the right-hand side (34). But this equals the aggregate marginal product of capital regardless of σ (Lemma 4). In contrast, the left-hand side (33) encodes individual marginal utilities and hence aggregation effects due to incomplete insurance and so on. 
II. Heterogeneous Investment Costs
We have argued in the previous two sections that in an economy with heterogeneity in productivity, a credit crunch shows up in TFP; in contrast, the investment wedge is either zero or small. The purpose of the next two sections is to argue that this is by no means necessarily the case. If heterogeneity takes a different form, a credit crunch can show up as either an investment or a labor wedge. In this section, we consider the case of heterogeneous investment costs and show that a credit crunch manifests itself as an investment wedge while aggregate TFP is unaffected by construction. The exact nature of the wedges depends on the particular definition of the investment wedge and the decentralization of the model, as we discuss at the end of this section.
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The economy is essentially the same as in Section I but differs in one important aspect: we replace heterogeneity in the productivity of final goods producers with heterogeneity in investment costs. To obtain one unit of investment goods, different entrepreneurs have to give up different amounts of consumption goods. The role of credit markets is then to reallocate funds towards those entrepreneurs with low investment costs.
Besides allowing us to make the point that different forms of heterogeneity have different aggregate implications, the case of heterogeneous investment cost is also useful to relate to much of the existing literature on financial frictions and business cycles. In particular, a number of papers make the assumption that each period "investment opportunities" arrive randomly to some exogenous fraction of entrepreneurs. Only entrepreneurs with an "investment opportunity" can acquire new investment goods; others cannot. 33 In our framework, this corresponds to an extreme form of heterogeneous investment costs: either investment costs are zero, corresponding to the arrival of an investment opportunity, or infinite.
A. Preferences, Technology, and Budgets
There is a representative final goods producer with technology y t = A K t α L 1−α . Hence there is no heterogeneity in final goods production. 34 Since TFP is exogenous, 32 As pointed out by Kurlat (2013) who analyzes a similar model with heterogeneity in the efficiency of investment, a credit crunch in models like his and ours may manifest itself as an efficiency wedge in addition to an investment wedge if capital formation is measured inaccurately. If capital formation measures fail to take into account decreases in the efficiency of investment due to a worse allocation of resources, a credit crunch in one period would show up as decreased aggregate TFP in future periods. Related, a decline in current TFP would arise if GDP were measured using the relative prices of consumption and investment for some base year, as is commonly done in practice. We here instead operate under the assumption that capital is measured correctly and that GDP is measured in units of consumption at current prices. 33 The following papers all feature such heterogeneous "investment opportunities": Bernanke and Gertler (1989); Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) ; Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) ; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) ; Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) ; Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) ; Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) ; Kurlat (2013); and Wang and Wen (2012) . Exceptions with heterogeneous productivity are Kiyotaki (1998) ; Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) ; and Khan and Thomas (2013) . 34 An alternative assumption that also implies that final goods production can be summarized by an aggregate production function is that there is heterogeneity in productivity but final goods producers do not face any credit (or other) constraints. The fact that homogeneity of final goods producers is equivalent to perfect credit markets for final goods producers underlines again that the important feature of a model is how credit constraints interact with heterogeneity.
an immediate implication is that a credit crunch cannot result in an efficiency wedge by assumption. Final goods producers rent capital from entrepreneurs at a rental rate r t . In equilibrium, r t = α y t / K t .
There is still a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] . These entrepreneurs have the same preferences as before, (1), but to make our point in the simplest way, we restrict the analysis to the case of log utility σ = 1 . They own and accumulate capital, and rent it to the representative firm. Entrepreneurs differ in their investment costs which we denote by ω it . To increase the capital stock by x it units of capital, an entrepreneur has to give up ω it x it units of the final good where ω it ≥ 1 . Each period, entrepreneurs draw a new investment cost from a distribution ψ(ω) . The budget constraint of an entrepreneur is therefore
The law of motion for capital and the borrowing constraint are unchanged and given by (3) and (6). As before, entrepreneurs simply maximize their utility subject to these constraints. We also continue to assume that workers don't save and simply consume their labor income.
B. Aggregation and credit crunch
To answer the question whether there will be an investment wedge in this economy, we can aggregate individual Euler equations in a similar fashion to Section IF.
PROPOSITION 4: in the economy with heterogeneous investment costs, the Euler equation of the "representative entrepreneur" takes the form
Therefore, a credit crunch results in an entrepreneurial investment wedge, τ Xt E , defined recursively by
In contrast to the case with heterogeneous productivity, heterogeneous investment costs imply that the Euler equation of a representative entrepreneur (41) appears distorted. With imperfect credit markets, some entrepreneurs with investment costs, ω it > 1 will be active and hold positive capital stocks, k it+1 > 0 and therefore
Comparing this aggregate Euler equation to the equation defining the entrepreneurial investment wedge, (15), it is obvious that τ Xt E ≠ 0 . The second part of the proposition makes this intuition precise. It is in fact tempting to set the entrepreneurial investment wedge equal to 1 (41) is best thought of as "undistorted." A credit crunch worsens the allocation of resources across heterogeneous investment cost types and hence looks like a sector-specific negative TFP shock in a two-sector representative agent model, namely one that hits only the investment goods producing sector. Such a two-sector representative agent model would feature an undistorted Euler equation, but one that differs from that in a one-sector model because fluctuations in investment goods TFP will enter this equation in exactly the same way as fluctuations in a tax on investment. This is the sense in which a credit crunch shows up as an investment wedge from the point of view of a one sector aggregate representation of this economy, even though the Euler equation of the aggregate of firm owners is undistorted. 35 Summarizing, in a model with heterogeneous investment costs, the results from the model with heterogeneous productivities are reversed: a credit crunch results in an entrepreneurial investment wedge and-by construction-in no efficiency wedge. This is illustrated in Figure 5 (but see the discussion in footnote 32 on capital measurement issues and their implications for wedges). 36 35 To make this point clearer, consider an alternative decentralization in which entrepreneurs sell the investment goods to a representative final goods producer, who owns and accumulates capital, at a price p t . In addition, assume that entrepreneurs can collateralize a fraction θ t of the investment goods produced, d it+1 ≤ θ t+1 x it . In this case, the equilibrium price of investment equals the cost of the least efficient active entrepreneur p t = ω _ t , which is greater than or equal to the price that would prevail in the absence of financial frictions, i.e., p t = 1 if θ t+1 = 1 . 36 We assume that the investment cost is uniformly distributed over [1, 1.1] . We consider the same shock to the collateral constraint as in the benchmark model. 
III. Heterogeneous Recruitment Costs
We have shown that two different assumptions on the dimension along which individual entrepreneurs are heterogeneous can lead to a credit crunch resulting in either an efficiency or an investment wedge. In this section, we show that with heterogeneity in yet another dimension, namely labor recruitment costs, a credit crunch can also show up as a labor wedge.
Our starting point is the observation that with some form of labor search frictions, labor looks very much like capital. In particular, search models typically have the feature that, in order to increase their labor force, firms have to post vacancies one period in advance, exactly in the same way they invest to increase their stock of physical capital. 37 This implies that financial frictions have the potential to affect employment and hence the labor wedge. 38 We show in this section that an extension of our previous model that features labor search frictions, in combination with heterogeneity across entrepreneurs in the cost of recruiting, can indeed deliver a labor wedge. The result follows exactly the same logic as our previous results on the investment and efficiency wedges. A credit crunch affects the allocation of labor across entrepreneurs with different recruitment costs in such a way that the aggregate cost of recruiting increases which delivers a drop in employment and hence an increase in the labor wedge. If instead, our model were to feature heterogeneity in productivity, a credit crunch would show up as a TFP wedge (see Appendix D where we work out such a model).
Heterogeneous recruitment costs are not merely a theoretical construct that we use to make our point. For instance, Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2013) examine US data and find substantial heterogeneity in the cross-section of the "vacancy yield" of firms (the number of realized hires per reported job opening).
A. Preferences, Technology, and Budgets
There is again a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] . They have the preferences in (1). Each entrepreneur employs ℓ it workers and produces y it = A ℓ it units of output. Note that, in contrast to the previous sections, there is no capital for simplicity. With search frictions, labor becomes a state variable so dropping capital from the model allows us to work with only one state variable and retain closed-form solutions. Furthermore, productivity, A , is homogeneous across firms. Therefore there is no efficiency wedge by assumption. An entrepreneur's employment evolves according to
where x it is the number of new hires and δ is the exogenous rate of job separations. In order to hire a worker, an entrepreneur has has to post a costly vacancy. We assume that in order to attract x it workers, an entrepreneur has to post ω it x it vacancies. We refer to 1/ ω it as the "vacancy yield." ω it is drawn from ψ(ω) , and is assumed to be independent and identically distributed across entrepreneurs and over time. Posting one vacancy costs one unit of the consumption good and hence the budget constraint of an entrepreneur is
Note that we assume that all entrepreneurs pay a common wage, w t . Given that search frictions introduce the possibility of different wage determination mechanisms and that these search frictions are heterogeneous across firms, this is not necessarily the case. However, we show below that such a common wage is consistent with individual rationality. We therefore proceed using the assumption of a common wage. We change our borrowing constraint slightly. We assume that an entrepreneur can issue debt worth at most a fraction θ t of output in the next period:
The reason for working with this slightly different constraint is that our previous constraint (6) has capital on the right-hand side. The result that a credit crunch shows up as a labor wedge when recruitment costs are heterogeneous would remain unchanged if we reintroduced capital into the model and worked with the constraint (6). However, we could no longer obtain closed-form solutions in this case. That being said, entrepreneurs maximize their utility, (1), subject to (43), (44), and (45). Workers have preferences (4) which we specialize to
where γ > 0 measures the disutility of working, and ε > 0 is the Frisch (constant marginal utility of wealth) elasticity of labor supply. We continue to assume that workers cannot save and simply consume their labor income, c t W = w t L t . With the preferences in (46), the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is given by v′(L)/u′(c) = γ L 1/ε c . Using that in our economy without capital, α = 0 and y t = A L t , the labor wedge-as defined in (14)-reduces to
Furthermore, a useful benchmark is provided by the economy without labor market frictions in which workers' marginal rate of substitution equals the wage,
Since workers are hand-to-mouth workers, c t W = w t L t , this implies that frictionless employment L t * is constant over time
We show below that with labor market frictions in the form of recruitment costs, this is no longer true and instead there is time-varying unemployment. There is therefore a tight connection between fluctuations in the labor wedge and fluctuations in unemployment.
B. Wages
In models with search frictions, wages are typically determined through Nash-bargaining between employers and employees. We work out the Nash bargaining solution in Appendix E and show that the fact that entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their recruitment costs, ω it , results in entrepreneur-specific wages being paid. This makes the Nash solution somewhat complicated to work with, in particular given that our stated goal is to derive simple characterizations of aggregate variables. We therefore pursue a different approach in the main text, exploiting the well-known fact that search models typically feature a set of wages that workers are willing to accept and that employers are willing to pay (Hall 2005) . Any such wage satisfies the condition that no worker-employer pair has an unexploited opportunity for mutual improvement. This is useful because there is, in particular, a common wage that is in this bargaining set.
LEMMA 6: A sufficient condition for a common wage, w t , to be in the bargaining set is
This lemma simply states that any wage greater than the marginal rate of substitution, γ L t 1/ε c t W , but smaller than the marginal product of labor, A , is in the bargaining set. 40 We then simply impose an ad hoc wage rule, namely that the wage always lies exactly halfway between the bounds in Lemma 6:
Since workers are hand-to-mouth workers, c t W = w t L t , we immediately get that the common wage is
) . 40 The same condition is made use of in Blanchard and Galí (2010).
C. individual Behavior
We obtain the following characterization of an entrepreneur's optimal choice of recruits and hence workers next period.
LEMMA 7: The optimal labor choice of an entrepreneur satisfies
Note that this expression is of the same form as the optimal savings policy function in the case with debt-constrained capital accumulation, (21). The term in brackets on the right-hand side of (48) is an entrepreneur's "cash-on-hand." The assumption of log utility then implies that he then "saves" a constant fraction β of this "cash-on-hand." Here, one of the entrepreneur's assets is his stock of workers, valued by their opportunity cost in terms of final goods, ω it ℓ it+1 .
D. Aggregation and credit crunch
We want to show that in the present model with heterogeneous recruitment costs, a credit crunch results in a labor wedge. To do so, we aggregate (48) over all entrepreneurs and obtain the following characterization of the evolution of employment and hence the labor wedge. 
PROPOSITION 5: Aggregate employment evolves according to
L t+1 = β Ω t −1 [ A + (1 − δ) ∫ ω it ℓ it __ L t di − w t ] L t , w t = A __________ 2 − γ L t (1+ε)/ε where Ω t ≡ ∫ ω it ℓ it+1 / L t+1 di
IV. Implications of a Credit Crunch besides Wedges
Up to this point we have focused on the implications of a credit crunch for very particular aggregates, namely aggregate wedges. But what are the implications for other variables? In this section, we first discuss implications for other macroeconomic aggregates, and then turn to implications at the micro level. We also use this opportunity to point to what we think are promising avenues for future research and to discuss related work. In doing so, we discuss how the behavior of some variables in our three model variants compares to that of their empirical counterparts in recent recessions. Figure 7 plots the response to a credit crunch of six aggregate variables in our three model variants.
A. Aggregate implications
41 Panels A and B show that GDP and aggregate consumption fall in all three variants. Panel C plots investment for our first two model variants (there is no capital in the third variant). Not surprisingly investment falls more in the variant with heterogeneous investment costs in which a credit crunch affects the economy's ability to produce capital. Notably, consumption and investment comove. Panel D plots the interest rate which falls sharply in all three model variants. This is because the interest rate is determined by the productivity of the marginal entrepreneur, which falls following a credit crunch. Panels E and F plot the aggregate marginal product of capital and the spread between that marginal product and the interest rate ("return premium").
42 In our benchmark model, both the aggregate marginal product and the interest rate fall (the former because TFP falls) so the overall effect is theoretically ambiguous. But in the specification in the figure, the interest rate falls more than the marginal product so that the return premium rises. 43 In the variant with heterogeneous investment costs, the marginal product rises and the interest rate falls so the return premium necessarily increases. Finally, panels G and H plot the ratio of (gross) aggregate debt relative to GDP ("external finance to GDP ratio") and to capital, which fall sharply in all three model variants. Not surprisingly, the use of external funds to finance investment or recruitment costs is a good indicator of a credit crunch. 44 We compare the behavior of these model aggregates to that of their empirical counterparts in recent recessions in Section IVC below. 41 We use the same parameter values as in the previous figures. 42 The aggregate marginal product is α y t / K t + 1 − δ and the return premium α y t / K t − δ − r t . 43 For other specifications of our benchmark model, the return premium may decrease in response to a credit crunch. The precise form of the assumed productivity distribution matters: for example, one can show that with a uniform productivity distribution as in the figure the return premium necessarily increases; but with a Pareto distribution it necessarily decreases. 44 In fact, in our first two model variants, the external finance to capital ratio directly identifies the collateral constraint parameter θ t−1 : D t / K t = θ t−1 (this uses the fact that entrepreneurs are either inactive so employ zero capital and lend, or are active in which case they use capital and exhaust their borrowing limit (6)). The external finance to GDP ratio then equals the product of the collateral constraint parameter and the capital to output ratio D t / y t = θ t−1 K t / y t . In our third model variant with heterogeneous recruitment costs, the collateral constraint parameter equals the ratio of (gross) aggregate debt to GDP, D t / y t = θ t−1 .
B. Micro-Level implications
Given that we emphasize the importance of heterogeneity, it is natural to not only examine aggregate implications of a credit crunch but also those for certain distributions of variables at the micro level. We here highlight three of these: the amount of capital reallocation, the productivity distribution of active firms, and the employment share of firms at different points in the productivity distribution. First, in all our model variants, a credit crunch has real effects because it worsens the allocation of resources across heterogeneous firms. Tightening collateral constraints mean that a firm experiencing a high productivity draw now borrows and invests less. This results in a decline of measures of capital reallocation, such as the gross flow of capital across firms. Second, in all three model variants, a credit crunch results in a decrease of a productivity threshold for being active. In our benchmark model with heterogeneous producers, it is this entry of unproductive firms which causes a drop in TFP (see Proposition 1). We discuss related empirical evidence below, but note already that this is in contrast to the so-called "cleansing effect" of recessions (Caballero and Hammour 1994) . Third, in all three model variants, a credit crunch results in a decrease of the share of employment of the, say, top 10 percent most productive firms. As less productive entrepreneurs become active and use labor and capital, the share of factors employed by the most productive entrepreneurs declines.
C. recent recessions and Avenues for Future research
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate quantitatively whether our three model variants can account for business cycle fluctuations observed in the data, or whether financial shocks are an important driver of the business cycle, we now discuss briefly how the empirical counterparts of the variables we have discussed so far have behaved in recent recessions. We argue that future research may want to pursue the mechanisms in our first and third model variants in more detail, and that our second model variant holds less promise. We then point to some related research that already pursues these directions.
First, consider aggregate TFP. It is well-known that TFP is procyclical and the recent Great Recession was no exception (see e.g., Hall forthcoming). 45 In our benchmark model, a credit crunch results in a fall in aggregate TFP, but the same is not true in the second and third model variants. We consider this an attractive feature of the benchmark model. Related, consumption and investment in the data comove over the business cycle, which they also do in our first two model variants ( Figure 7) . Next, consider the investment and labor wedges (which may be useful moments for discriminating between models, as long as they are not used as diagnostics to "identify" shocks). In the data, the labor wedge is considerably more countercyclical than the investment wedge (see e.g., Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2007) , which is suggestive evidence against our second model variant and in favor of the third. In the Great Recession, short-term nominal interest rates fell sharply until they reached zero, and corresponding real interest rates have been slightly negative since. Related, measures of the spread between the return to capital and the risk-free interest rate have widened in the Great Recession (Hall forthcoming). This is qualitatively consistent with the behavior of the interest rate and the return 45 Hall calculates a cumulative productivity shortfall of 3.4 percent from 2007 to 2013 which occurred almost entirely in years 2008 and 2009 (table 1). These numbers are sensitive to adjustments for factor utilization as in Fernald (2012) , but Hall argues that such utilization variations are not an important element of fluctuations in measured TFP growth. premium in our model (Figure 7 , panels D to F). 46 Finally, Buera, Fattal-Jaef, and Shin (2014) document that the external finance to GDP ratio fell during the Great Recession, particularly for the US noncorporate sector, consistent with panels G and H of Figure 7 . Regarding evidence at the micro level, Rampini (2006, and updated data series, 2013) find that the amount of capital reallocation between firms (sales of property, plant and equipment, and acquisitions) decreases in recessions including the Great Recession. 47 The evidence on the productivity distribution of active firms, and the employment share of firms at different points in the productivity distribution is less clear cut.
48 Related micro-level implications are explored in greater detail by Buera, Fattal-Jaef, and Shin (2014) for a version of the model with diminishing returns at the individual level.
Summarizing, our first and third model variants are qualitatively consistent with the empirical behavior of some key variables in recent recessions, while our second model variant performs less well. Asking which features of the macro and micro data can be quantitatively accounted for by a credit crunch in models with heterogeneous productivity or recruitment costs (or both) is therefore a promising avenue for future research. The recent contributions of Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2012); Khan and Thomas (2013) ; Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2014) ; and Buera, Fattal-Jaef, and Shin (2014) already go this route for the case of heterogeneous producers and argue that such models can quantitatively account for features of the Great Recession.
V. Conclusion
The main message of this paper is that while trying to learn about the sources of business cycles using a representative agent framework and aggregate data alone may seem appealing, this approach is invalidated by the presence of heterogeneity. This follows from our result that the mapping from a credit crunch in a heterogeneous agent economy to the aggregate variables in a representative agent economy depends crucially on the form of underlying heterogeneity; depending on where an economy features heterogeneity, a credit crunch can show up in very different aggregate variables. To make this argument concrete, we have examined the implications of a credit crunch for simple aggregate wedges. We have shown that a credit crunch shows up as an efficiency wedge if there is heterogeneity in the productivity of final 46 Related, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) have shown that the interest rate implicit in an Euler equation with aggregate consumption covaries negatively with the Federal Funds rate. In our theory, this Euler equation interest rate is simply the aggregate marginal product of capital. In our benchmark model, the spread between the two rates widens following a credit crunch, but they are still positively correlated. In our second model variant, the two rates covary negatively, consistent with the finding of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba.
47 https://sites.google.com/site/andrealeisfeldt/home/capital-reallocation-and-liquidity. Also see Ziebarth (2012) and Sandleris and Wright (2014) for related evidence from the Great Depression and Argentine financial crisis.
48 Kehrig (2011) documents that the dispersion of productivity in US durable manufacturing is greater in recessions than in booms, which primarily reflects a relatively higher share of unproductive firms. This is in contrast to the so-called "cleansing effect" of recessions (Caballero and Hammour 1994) . We do not know of any evidence that is relevant for the model variants with heterogeneous investment or recruitment costs. The implication of the model that the share of employment of productive firms decreases in response to a credit crunch is consistent with the evidence in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2010), but only if we interpret large firms in the data as more productive. goods producers. In contrast, it shows up as an investment wedge if investment costs are heterogeneous; or as a labor wedge if recruitment costs are heterogeneous.
We have also examined implications of a credit crunch besides wedges, both at the macro and the micro level. We compared the behavior of variables in the model following a credit crunch to their empirical counterparts in recent recessions and found that some of these are qualitatively consistent in our model variants with heterogeneous productivity or recruitment costs. We therefore view such theories as promising avenues of future research.
Appendix A. Proofs PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
The lemma follows directly from using the definitions of cash-on-hand, m t and net worth, a t in the dynamic programming problem (17).
PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
The lemma follows from the linearity of the portfolio allocation problem, i.e., the maximization problem defining the function m ̃ t+1 ( a ′ , z) in Lemma 1.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3:
Consider the Bellman equation in (1) which can be written as
The proof proceeds with a guess and verify strategy. Guess that the value function takes the form V t (m, z) = v t (z) + B log m , and substitute it into the Bellman equation. In particular, note that E V t (m′, z′ ) = E v t (z′ ) + B log m′ . The first order equation is
The Bellman equation becomes
Collecting the terms involving log m , we see that B = 1/(1 − β) and a′ = βm as claimed. ∎ 
Labor demand is
It follows that output is y it = ( π t /α) z it k it . Aggregate output is then
Since k it = λ t−1 a it = λ t−1 β m it−1 if z it > z _ t and zero otherwise, we have
Hence y t = ( π t /α) λ t−1 X t K t . Next, consider the labor market clearing condition.
L 1−α and using it in the expression for output y t = (λ X t ) α K t α L 1−α . Eliminating λ t−1 using (A1), we obtain (22). The law of motion for aggregate capital is derived by integrating (21) over all entrepreneurs:
Using (A3) and (A4),
which is equation (23) in Proposition 1. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
Part (i): That τ Xt E = 0 follows directly from inspection of (16) and (26). Combining (A10) and (A11) and using that r t+1 = α y t+1 / K t+1 , yields (41).
PROOF OF LEMMA 6: The steps described here follow Shimer (2010) . First, consider entrepreneurs who solve Next, consider workers. From their point of view, employment evolves exogenously as L t+1 = (1 − δ) L t + f t (1 − L t ) . Here f t is the probability of finding a job which is defined by the requirement that the number of workers finding jobs, f t (1 − L t ) , is equal to the number of workers recruited by firms ∫ x it di and hence f t = ∫ x it di/(1 − L t ) . The value of a worker is
The marginal value for workers at the equilibrium level of employment of having one worker employed at a wage w t in period t rather than unemployed is
Entrepreneurs are willing to pay all wages for which V lt ( ℓ it , d it , ω it ) ≥ 0 in (A12).
Workers are willing to accept all wages for which W t ′ ( L t ) ≥ 0 in (A13). It is easy to see that a wage satisfying the condition in Lemma 6 satisfies both requirements. ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 7:
Defining "cash-on-hand" m it ≡ A ℓ it + (1 − δ) ω it ℓ it − w t ℓ it − (1 + r t ) d it , the budget constraint of an entrepreneur becomes c it − d it+1 + ω it ℓ it+1 = m it . The problem of an entrepreneur can then be stated in recursive form as Following similar steps as in the proof of Lemma 3, entrepreneurs save a constant fraction β of their cash-on-hand, m it , and hence their optimal labor choice satisfies (48). ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
The proposition follows directly from aggregating (48) across all entrepreneurs.
Appendix B: Alternative Modeling of Workers
We consider an extension where workers are allowed to save in a risk-free asset and they face shocks to their efficiency units of labor h . The recursive problem of a worker is summarized by the Bellman equation: c + a′ = w t hℓ + (1 + r t )a .
In the simulations presented in Figure 3 we consider a simple two state process for the efficiency units of labor, h ∈ {0, 1} , with transition probabilities [0.2 0.8; 0.05 0.95] . In addition, we assume that workers with zero efficiency units of labor receive a transfer equal to 0.4 w t . We interpret this model as roughly capturing an unemployment shock in a world with unemployment insurance that offers a 40 percent replacement ratio.
Appendix C. Model with Homogeneous Recruitment Costs and Heterogeneous Productivity
Consider the same model as in Section III but where entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their productivity; y it = z it ℓ it , z it is drawn from ψ(z) independent and identically distributed over time and across entrepreneurs. Everything remains unchanged except the budget constraint of an entrepreneur which now is
The equilibrium has the feature that there is a productivity cutoff for being active z _ t . Only entrepreneurs who are above this cutoff are active. Hence, the equivalent of the sufficient condition in Lemma 6 for a common wage, w t , to be in the bargaining set is γ L t 1/ε c t W ≤ w t ≤ z _ t . We again impose that the wage lies halfway between these bounds: 
, where z _ t+1 = w t+1 − 1 + δ . We can again show that the assumption of log utility implies that agents save a constant fraction of cash-on-hand, a it+1 = β m it or (C2)
